In emerging markets, the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders. Conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers are typically weak in containing the agency problem. This study examines whether external independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to alleviate the agency conflict. Using a broad sample of firms from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms are more likely to employ Big Five auditors when they are more subject to the agency problem imbedded in their ultimate ownership structure. This documented relation between auditor choice and the agency problem is not found in prior research in the U.S. and the U.K. where corporate ownership is more diffused and alternative governance mechanisms are more abundant. In addition, among East Asian auditees subject to the agency problem, Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit qualification threshold while non-Big Five auditors do not. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big Five auditors in emerging markets do have a corporate governance role.
Introduction
Weak corporate governance has been blamed as an important source of financing problems in East Asian economies. Since the financial crisis of 1997, improving corporate governance has become an important task for Asian governments and international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. One particular concern about promoting better governance is if any effective governance mechanisms exist that can mitigate the conflicts of interest between controlling owners and minority shareholders.
Unlike diffusely owned corporations in the U.S. and the U.K., listed corporations in East Asia are typically majority owned and controlled by families. 1 The governance problem associated with this typical concentrated ownership is that controlling owners' dealings, when at the expense of outside investors, are not easily contestable by internal and external control systems, i.e., boards of directors and takeover markets, respectively. For these corporations and controlling owners, the cost of this agency conflict comes from their common shares being traded at discount because of the price protection by the minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000a) .
Theory suggests that some monitoring and bonding mechanisms may develop to mitigate the agency problem and hence reduce financing costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . One such method is for the controlling owner of a firm to hire an independent external auditor to testify to the accuracy of the firm's financial statements. There is, however, a lack for evidence of a direct link between a firm's agency problem and its auditor choice in the U.S. literature. In this study, we use a broad sample of East Asian firms to examine if firms that are more subject to agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders hire better quality auditors.
Whether or not East Asian auditors fulfill the monitoring role to mitigate the agency problem has been a subject of debate. On the one hand, compared with external auditors in the U.S. and U.K., auditors in East Asia potentially have a stronger governance role because the conventional corporate control systems are weak in protecting outside investors (hypothesis one). 2 On the other hand, evidence in a United Nations report (Rahman, 1999) calls into question if external auditors actually succeed in acting as monitors. The report queries why Big Five auditors issued clean auditing opinions to large Asian companies and banks that would go bankrupt within a few months from the completion of their audits at the start of the Asian Financial Crisis (hypothesis two). There are several reasons why external auditors may fail to be effective monitors. First, the opaque nature of business dealings in this region makes auditing not desirable and extremely difficult (Backman, 1999) . Second, audit committees that represent the interests of outside shareholders to select external auditors are either ineffective or non-existent. Third, an external audit loses its value when the auditor's opinion may not bear significant consequences in emerging markets where legal enforcement is weak. Fourth, compared with the more developed economies, the lack of audit expertise in emerging markets could weaken auditors' monitoring role. Finally, conflicts between the auditing and consulting roles of auditing firms may weaken the auditors' incentives to be independent and consequently their credibility as effective monitors, a problem not unique to Asia. This problem is aggravated by the lack of effective regulatory mechanisms for the auditing profession in Asia.
To test our two opposing hypotheses, we examine firms' decisions to hire "name-brand" (Big Five) auditors. Big Five auditors have international reputations and are generally perceived to be more independent than local auditors. 3 If Big Five auditors are better monitors, the demand for their services should increase in response to clients' agency problems, according to the first hypothesis. In contrast, the second hypothesis suggests that a firm's choice of auditor is insensitive to its agency problems; a firm may even avoid hiring a Big Five auditor to reduce external monitoring.
In addition to examining the interplay between the agency problem and the choice of auditor, we investigate if auditors take into account firms' agency conflicts when making audit pricing and audit opinion decisions. If auditors serve as monitors and provide more assurance of quality through their superior reputations or if they exert efforts to mitigate agency conflicts, these efforts would be reflected in the audit fee.
Thus, we test if ceteris paribus auditors charge a premium to mitigate the agency problem. Finally, we test if poor earnings would more likely trigger a qualified opinion independent directors. There is also not a viable market for corporate control in this region, mainly resulting from concentrated ownership. Hostile takeovers are extremely rare. 3 Prior research such as Teoh and Wong (1993) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) has documented using U.S. data that Big Five auditors provide better quality service than non-Big Five auditors. In Asia, there is very little research providing direct evidence that Big Five auditors are superior. However, several studies, such as Simon, Ramanan, and Dugar (1986) , Simon, Teo, and Trompeter (1992) , and DeFond, Francis, and Wong (2000) , have documented the existence of a Big Five brand-name fee premium in Hong Kong, Singapore and India, which is consistent with prior research on U.S. firms that Big Five auditors are quality-differentiated from non-Big Five auditors in these Asian countries.
from the auditors to firms subject to large agency problems than to those subject to small agency problems. The loss exposure associated with firms' agency problems per se may be insignificant, but it will be magnified when the firms are in financial distress.
Thus, if auditors serve as effective monitors, they will be more stringent and thus give more qualified opinions to poorly performing clients with large agency problems.
To proxy for the extent of the agency problem in East Asian firms, we focus on the ultimate ownership and control structure of firms in eight East Asian economies.
The ultimate controlling owners are entrenched through their effective control of the firms (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) . In addition, the controlling owners often use complicated cross shareholdings and stock pyramids to leverage their control beyond what their equity ownership indicates. This creates a separation of control and ownership, which exacerbates the entrenchment problem of the controlling owners. We thereby use the controlling owner's ability to command effective control and the extent to which the control exceeds the actual corresponding portion of ownership to measure firms' agency problems. 4 We expect that the most serious agency problem will occur among firms whose ultimate owners enjoys effective control and but actually own only a small stake in the firm.
We find that firms are more likely to hire Big Five auditors when their ownership structure indicates agency conflicts, i.e., when their ultimate owners enjoy effective control but actually own only a small stake in the firm. Moreover, we find that firms with large agency problems do not hire more non-Big Five auditors. Further tests 4 There is a growing body of literature documenting that the separation of ownership and control is common among public corporations around the world. La Porta et al. (1999) report such evidence for reveal that the relation between auditor choice and ownership structure exists among small and high-risk firms whose controlling owner entrenchment problem is large, but not among large and low-risk firms whose controlling owner entrenchment problem is small. Our results also show that Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit qualification threshold to auditees with larger agency problems, while non-Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors charge clients with high control concentration and large divergence of control and ownership rights a fee premium. Also, we document that poor earnings can likely trigger a qualified opinion for Big Five clients with large agency problems. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big Five auditors do indeed have monitoring and bonding effects as predicted by the agency theory. This paper makes several contributions. First, this is the first study that examines how agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders affect the choice of auditors, audit fees and audit opinions. Second, the paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking corporate ownership structure with mandatory external audits. Auditor types, fees and opinions provide good quantifiable measures of the quality of this corporate governance mechanism. Third, from the policy perspective, this study provides insights into the question of whether or not auditors made errors before and during the Asian Financial Crisis. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how the ownership structure of a firm affects its choice of auditors and how that structure then affects the more than 600 corporations in 27 developed countries. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) report similar evidence in East Asia. fees and opinions of the auditor. We also present our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample data and Section 4 reports the empirical analyses. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
Development of hypotheses
There has been a long-standing interest in the accounting and finance literatures in examining how firms employ monitors and bonding mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts between firm managers and outside shareholders, to increase firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Hiring independent external auditors as monitors is one, though not a new, idea. Using a historical perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) document that independent audits were demanded since the days of English merchant guilds in the eleventh century to the time when audits were required by law in the twentieth century. Not only is an external audit valued and thus demanded in the absence of law, there is evidence that firms with agency problems are more likely to demand external audits. Chow (1982) uses a sample of U.S. companies from the 1926 Poor's Industrial Manual and documents that large size firms with high debt-equity ratios and many accounting-based debt covenants are more likely to hire external auditors. There have been several U.S. studies that examine auditor choice and the agency problem in more recent periods when external audits were required by law (Palmrose, 1984; Simunic and Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Eichenseher and Shield, 1989; DeFond, 1992) . The common theme of these studies is the linking of auditor choice or switches with the level and/or changes in firm size, leverage and management ownership. These studies find that large firms hire large and/or namebrand auditors. They fail to find consistent evidence that management ownership and leverage are relevant in a firm's choice of auditor.
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence detailing a relationship between the agency problem and auditor choice in these recent U.S. studies is that a wide spectrum of corporate governance mechanisms exist in the U.S. that could be employed to alleviate agency conflicts. The relative importance of external auditors serving as monitors may not be very high in the U.S. This motivates us to study the roles of auditors in East Asia where conventional corporate control systems, i.e., boards of directors and takeover markets, are generally weak in containing controlling owners' self-interested activities. In this environment, independent external auditors could be important monitors of controlling shareholders.
In contrast with U.S. and U.K. corporations that are typically diffusely owned, the ownership and control of East Asian corporations is concentrated. When ownership is diffuse as in the U.S. and the U.K., agency problems stem from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. As ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains effective control of the firm, as is the case of East Asia, the nature of agency problems shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
We use the ownership characteristics of the East Asian firms to capture empirically the extents of their agency problems. Specifically, an ultimate owner can determine how profits are shared among shareholders once he/she obtains effective control of the firm. The ultimate owner can opportunistically deprive minority shareholders of their rights to share profits. In addition, the ultimate owner's control is typically achieved through complicated cross shareholdings and stock pyramids. These arrangements often enable the ultimate owner to command a given level of control (voting rights) while committing a less-than-equivalent ownership investment (cash flow rights). The ultimate owner in this situation could extract wealth from the firm, receive the entire benefit, but only bear a fraction of the cost. We offer a simple pyramid structure to illustrate this point. A family owns 60% of the shares of Company A, which in turn owns 40% of the shares of Company B. As a conservative measure, we say that the family controls 40% of the voting power in Company B, which is the weakest link in this chain of control rights. However, the family owns only 24% of the cash flow rights of Company B, which is the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. Thus, every dollar stolen from Company B costs the family only 24 cents.
The ultimate owner's incentive to expropriate is expected to increase with the degree of the divergence between the control and the ownership. Taken together, we expect that the most serious agency problems should be found in firms whose ultimate owners enjoy effective control but actually own only small stakes in the firm. 5 We examine two opposing hypotheses concerning the role of auditors in East Asia. On the one hand, auditors in this region play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts. More specifically, we test if firms with large agency problems, proxied by their ultimate owners' level of voting rights compared with his/her cash flow rights, would have a larger demand for name-brand (Big Five) auditors who have international reputations and are generally perceived to be more independent. Thus, our formal (alternative) hypothesis is:
H1: A firm's demand for hiring a Big Five auditing firm is positively related to its ultimate owner's ability to obtain effective control and/or the degree of control and ownership divergence.
On the other hand, the lack of market demand for and the auditors' willingness to supply quality audits may render it impossible for external auditors to be effective monitors. On the demand side, controlling owners may desire to hire non-Big Five auditors to reduce external monitoring. Although an external audit could serve as a bonding mechanism to mitigate the agency problem, Backman (1999) argues that auditing runs against the general culture in Asia where business transactions are relationship based. The idea of needing to monitor and to double-check a company's accounts implies distrust and may lead to open confrontation between owners and investors. Also, political rent seeking is prevalent and highly lucrative in East Asia.
Firms in this region may choose to remain opaque in order to prevent competition and social sanctions. However, even if minority shareholders demand high-quality external audits, they can always be out-voted by the controlling owner. 6 In addition, investors may question the value of external audits because the rendered opinions by the auditors often do not result in appropriate legal sanctions on firms in emerging markets where law enforcement is weak. On the supply side, the lack of audit expertise and experienced professionals in the local auditing profession weakens auditors' ability to serve as effective monitors. 7 Also, their monitoring role may be in conflict with their consulting activities with client firms, an issue not unique to Asia. There has been a growing concern that the lack of disciplinary mechanisms in the auditing profession may have weakened the independence of auditors in Asia. 8 Consistent with this view, DeFond, Wong, and Li (2000) find that as the Chinese government made efforts to improve auditor independence, domestic firms listed in China took flight from high quality to low quality auditors. They document that in 1996, the percentage of qualified opinions increased by nine fold after the promulgation of new auditing standards to improve audit quality. However, as audit firms toughen their standards, those that provided high quality monitoring service lost market share to low quality audit firms.
The above discussion suggests that a firm's choice of auditor does not reflect the presence of agency problems. Indeed, controlling owners who experience agency 7 The number of CPAs (certified public accountants) and/or CAs (chartered accountants) as a percentage of the population is low among East Asian countries compared with the U.S. (0.1%), Canada (0.3%), and Australia (0.6%). Except for Hong Kong (0.2%) and Singapore (0.2%), most other East Asian countries such as Korea (0.01%), Indonesia (0.006%), Malaysia (0.07%), the Philippines (0.02%), and Thailand (0.008%) are significantly below the standards of developed economies in regards to the numbers of CPAs and CAs. Schipper (2000) argues that the lack of expertise and professionalism greatly limit the quality of auditors in developing economies. 8 In economies such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, there have been questions concerning the effectiveness of self-regulation of the accounting profession in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis (The Hong Kong Economic Journal, April 22, 1999; New Straits Times Press, February 16, 1997) . Even in places such as Thailand where the accounting profession is regulated by government, there have been conflicts may actually avoid hiring Big Five auditors to evade monitoring. The formal (alternative) hypothesis according to this pessimistic view is:
H2: A firm's demand for hiring Big Five accountancy firms is unrelated (negatively related) to its ultimate owner's ability to obtain effective control and/or the degree of divergence between control and ownership rights.
In addition to examining how agency problems affect a firm's choice of auditors, we use audit pricing to measure if auditors charge for their clients' agency problems when setting their fees. Fulfilling a monitoring role by providing assurance of auditing quality through the auditing company's superior reputation or exerting efforts to mitigate agency conflicts will be reflected in the auditing fee. We therefore test if ceteris paribus East Asian auditors charge their clients who have larger agency problems higher fees. Our formal (alternative) hypothesis is:
H3: The auditing fee charged to a firm is positively related to the firm's ultimate owner's ability to obtain effective control and/or the degree of divergence between cash flow and voting rights.
Prior studies on auditing fees have focused on examining how firm size or brand name (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984) , industry specialization (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995; DeFond, Francis, and Wong, 2000) , and litigation risk (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996) affect auditing fees. Using a sample of 67 Hong Kong listed firms, Gul, Tsui, and Chen (1998) document that family control is associated with lower auditing fees. They interpret the result as being consistent with government reports admitting that the monitoring efforts are inadequate (Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand, 1999) . the view that family firms are subject to fewer agency problems than non-family firms.
Our study would be the first that specifically tests if audit pricing is a function of the client firm's agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders.
Finally, we test if low earnings are more likely to trigger qualified opinions by auditors for client firms with larger agency problems than for client firms with smaller agency problems. The loss exposure associated with the client firm's agency problems per se may be a small concern when the firm is profitable, but it will become more serious when the firm is in financial distress. In addition, when a firm approaches its terminal year, the risk of expropriation by its controlling owner increases because the expected penalty if being detected is low. Thus, in bad times, controlling owners are more prone to engage in self-interested behavior. If auditors serve as external monitors, they will more likely give qualified opinions to poorly performing firms with large agency problems. Our formal (alternative) hypothesis is: H4: Poor earnings will more likely trigger qualified opinions by auditors for firms whose ultimate owners possess high degrees of control and achieve the control through less-than-equivalent ownership investment.
Data sample
Our primary data source is Worldscope. This database contains annual data regarding auditor names, auditing fees, auditing opinions, and financial information for listed companies from over 40 economies around the world. From the database, we select sample firms from eight East Asian economies --Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. We select 1994 through 1996 as the period of analysis. We do not include the post-1996 period in our study to avoid possible structural shifts after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. We also exclude pre-1994 data because there is too much missing data in this earlier period.
We need to identify who the ultimate owners of each firm and what share of the control and ownership rights they hold. For this ownership information, we refer to data assembled in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) . Their ownership database tracks the ultimate ownership structure of about 3,000 publicly traded corporations in nine East Asian economies as of 1996, including the eight economies we selected for study. As the ownership of our sample firms is stable over the sample period, we feel it is reasonable to merge the 1996 ownership data with the 1994-1996 audit and financial data.
Basic statistics
As shown in Table 1 Not all the firms in Worldscope contain audit opinion information. In our sample, only 2,335 firm year observations include an audit opinion. Table 2 presents the percentage of qualified opinions by economy and by year in our sample. 11 On average, only two percent of the companies in our sample received a qualified opinion.
The percentage of qualified opinions is highest in 1995 and lowest in 1994. In addition, the cross-economy distribution of qualified opinions is not even with Indonesia reporting no qualified opinions, while Thailand reported 13.3% opinions from 1994 to 1996.
Auditing fees are not mandatorily disclosed except in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Thus, Worldscope contains auditing fee data only for these three economies 9 As in year 1996, the percentages of companies represented in our sample are 37% for Hong Kong, 47% for Indonesia, 22% for Korea, 20% for Malaysia, 33% for the Philippines, 56% for Singapore, 13% for Taiwan and 18% for Thailand. 10 A case in point is the merger of Arthur Andersen and SyCip, Gorres, Velayo and Company (SVG) in the Philippines. SVG was a local firm set up by Washington SyCip in Manila in 1946. During our sample period of 1994 to 1996, Arthur Andersen joined with SVG, which explains why the percentage of market share for Big Five firms increased from 19.2% to 87.7% in the Philippines during this period. 11 A qualified opinion includes disclaimer and adverse opinions. For Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, the standards and format for the audit report generally follow those of the U.S. The standards and reporting format of the audit report in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore generally follow the international auditing guidelines. in our sample, comprising 1,304 firm year observations. The mean and median auditing fees of the three economies are reported in Table 3 . The fee data show that Hong Kong firms spend the most in US dollars (Panel A) and as percentage of assets (Panel B) on auditor services, while Malaysian firms incur the lowest fees for such services.
Measuring the ultimate owners' control and ownership levels
Most prior studies of ownership structure focus on immediate ownership, which constitutes common shares directly owned by individuals or institutions. Immediate ownership is not sufficient for characterizing the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms, as these firms are often associated with complicated indirect ownership. In contrast to these prior studies, we focus on ultimate ownership as identified in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) . For a given firm, the ultimate owners and their share of control (voting) and ownership (cash flow) rights are identified. To make the distinction between voting and cash flow rights, firm-specific information on pyramid structures and cross-holdings is required.
The procedure for identifying the ultimate owners is similar to the one used by La Porta et al. (1999) . An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder who holds at least 5% of the voting rights of the company and who is not controlled by anybody else.
To economize on the data collection task, tracing further voting control stops at 50% and the ultimate owner's voting rights level is set equal to 50% once we reach this level. This ceiling is reasonable because the ultimate owner unambiguously gains full control once 50% of the voting rights is secured. Although a company can have more than one ultimate owner, we focus on the largest ultimate owner. With the highest level of voting rights, the largest ultimate owner is more likely than smaller owners to be the controlling owner of the firm. For a given firm, an ultimate owner's voting control level is defined as the ownership stake at the weakest link along the control chains connecting the ultimate owner and the firm. The cash flow rights that support the control by the ultimate owner is the sum of the products of ownership stakes of affiliated firms from each control chain identified.
Consistent with statistics reported by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Fan and Wong (2000) , East Asian corporations exhibit high levels of concentration of control in our sample: the mean level of voting rights of the ultimate owner is 27%. This is in contrast to U.S. firms studied in most prior research, which are characterized by diffuse ownership and control. The highest mean control concentration is found in Thailand (35%), followed by Indonesia (34%), Hong Kong (29%), and Malaysia (28%), Singapore (27%), Taiwan (19%), and Korea (17%). The sample mean cash flowing rights over voting rights (CV) of 87% indicates that there is a significant degree of divergence between the two rights. The mean CV ratios across the eight economies in ascending order are: Indonesia (79%), Singapore (82%), Taiwan (84%), Malaysia (86%), Hong Kong (88%), Korea (89%), the Philippines (91%) and Thailand (96%).
Empirical Analysis
This section reports the results of our empirical tests on the determination of auditor choice, auditing fee, and auditing opinions.
Auditor choice
We test our first two hypotheses that a firm's choice of auditor is related to the firm's ownership structure using the following pooled cross-sectional LOGIT regression model: We include total assets and leverage in the model to control for client size and risk. In addition, GROUP and PYRAMID are used as a control for organization complexity. 12 Firms belonging to complex corporate groups are likely to have numerous related party transactions, which complicate the earnings recognition and accounting consolidation processes. This is particularly the case for firms in the top layers of pyramids that have to incorporate earnings of their affiliated firms on the lower layers of pyramids. 13 We expect that group firms and particularly firms in the top layers of pyramids to have a stronger demand for Big Five auditors. The three ownership variables, DEV, CV and DEV*CV are our experimental variables. To be consistent with H1, we should find that more firms with concentrated control (DEV=1) and/or larger separation of control and ownership (CV<1) hire Big Five auditors. Thus, we expect that the coefficient of DEV is positive, and the coefficients of CV and/or DEV*CV negative. To be consistent with H2, we should find the null or the opposite results. That is, the coefficient of DEV is insignificant to negative, and the coefficients of CV and/or DEV*CV insignificant to positive.
Before presenting our regression results, we compare each 1996 explanatory variable pooled across all economies for the Big Five and the non-Big Five clients. The results presented in Table 4 show that the control concentration and the divergence 12 The information on pyramids is from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) . The group affiliation information is from Claessens et al. (2000b) , which includes 170 large corporate groups across the eight economies. Firms that are affiliated with small groups, i.e., outside the 170 groups, are treated as independent firms. Firms belonging to the same group do not always hire the same auditor, nor do they always hire auditors in the same class (Big Five or non-Big Five). Each group on average has four member firms (in our final sample) and hires two distinct Big Five auditors and one non-Big Five auditor. Fifty-five of the 170 groups hire at least one Big Five auditor and one non-Big Five auditor among their members. between control and ownership rights are statistically significantly higher for Big Five clients than for non-Big Five clients based on the t-test for means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. This evidence is consistent with H1 and at odds with H2.
In addition, there is a higher proportion of Big Five clients belonging to corporate groups based on the mean and median tests, suggesting that the demand for Big Five auditors is associated with group complexity. In terms of client size, Big Five clients have larger mean and median total assets but only the difference in mean is statistically significant. However, leverage and the proportion of firms at the bottom of the pyramids are not statistically different between the two groups. Table 5 presents the LOGIT regression results estimated for the pooled sample period from 1994 to 1996 and separately in each of the three years. Fixed effects are included in the regressions where appropriate, but for simplicity they are not reported.
The pooled time-series results show that large firm and group firms in the upper layers of pyramids are more likely to hire Big Five auditors. Also, DEV is positive and statistically significant, while DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant. This supports H1 that demand for Big Five auditors is positively associated with the degree of agency problems as captured by the controlling owners' ability to command effective control and the divergence of their control and ownership. Similar to the pooled time-series results, the coefficient of DEV is positive and significant, while DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant in the 1994 and 1995 regressions. In the 1996 regression, CV is negative and significant while other ownership variables are 13 Except for Korea where consolidation of accounts from subsidiaries is required only in supplementary statements, all other economies in our sample require consolidation in the companies' not statistically significant. Taking both the pooled time-series and annual regression results together, the evidence is consistent with H1 that East Asian firms hire Big Five firms to mitigate their agency conflicts, but it is not consistent with H2.
To test further the effect of agency conflicts between majority shareholders and minority shareholders on the demand for Big Five auditors, we partition our sample by client size, profit and leverage. For a given ownership structure, we expect that the degree of agency conflicts is more severe in small, low profit, or high leverage firms.
The entrenchment problem of the controlling owners is large when the expected loss from being detected is small. Controlling owners of firms that have poor reputations or are in financial distress are particularly prone to engage in self-interested behaviors at the expense of outside investors, as their expected loss of reputation and business is low. To be consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we should find that the hypothesized effects of effective control and divergence between control and ownership rights on auditor choice stronger for small, low profit, or high leverage firms and weaker for larger, more profitable, and low leverage firms. Table 6 reports the pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions partitioned by client profit, leverage, and size separately. The sample partition is based on the withineconomy three-year medians. For example, client firms are partitioned into the high (low) profit subgroup if their return on assets is higher (lower) than the corresponding three-year median in the economy. The regression presented in Table 5 is re-estimated using the high and low profit subgroups separately. This procedure is repeated for leverage measured by total liability over total assets and then for size measured by total primary financial statements. assets. The results show that DEV is positive and significant while DEV*CV is negative and significant in the small and the high leverage firms but not in the large and the low leverage firms, while these results are present in both the high and the low profit samples. The evidence in Table 6 supports our prediction that small and high leverage firms tend to have more severe entrenchment problems and, thus their choice of Big Five auditors is more sensitive to their ownership structure. 14 To examine further if the reported effect of the agency problem on the demand for Big Five auditors clusters in particular economies, we re-estimate the LOGIT regression economy by economy. As shown in Table 7 , the ownership results are consistent with H1 in several economies, though not clustering in any single economy.
The effect of concentration of ownership (DEV) on the demand for Big Five auditors is positive in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The effect of CV is negative for Korea, while the joint effect of DEV and CV is negative for Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. It is interesting to note that the association between our measure of agency conflicts and preference for Big Five auditors is also found in Korea, where there are only Big Five-affiliated auditors.
As a diagnostic check, we examine, economy by economy, whether the agency problem affects the choice between non-Big Five auditors and the Big Five auditor that has the largest market share in the economy. The market share of each Big Five auditor is computed based on the auditor's total number of clients divided by the number of listed firms in our sample. 15 If the Big Five market leader commands the best reputation in the economy, excluding Big Five non-market leaders from our economy-byeconomy regressions would increase the power of the test. This conjecture is confirmed by our results that DEV is positive and significant in all economies in our study but Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, while DEV*CV is negative and significant in all the economies but Indonesia and Thailand. 16 The insignificant results in Indonesia and Thailand are consistent with H2, which suggests that auditors may not be fulfilling their monitoring role in these two economies where the demand and supply of good quality auditors are the weakest.
In summary, we find that East Asian corporations whose ultimate owners possess high voting control and have a large divergence of control and ownership rights are more likely to employ Big Five auditors. This result supports the view that external auditors play a monitoring and bonding role that mitigates the agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors in this region. However, the economy-byeconomy results indicate that choice of auditor is insensitive to the agency problem in Indonesia and Thailand, which suggests that external auditors fail to serve as monitors in these two economies.
Audit fee
To test our third hypothesis that the auditing fee reflects a client firm's agency problem, we run the following pooled time-series cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression:
where, for sample firm i and year t, LAF it = the natural log of total auditing fees at year t; SIZE it = the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t;
ROA it = the net income divided by total assets at year t;
LEV it = the long-term debt divided by total assets at year t;
CACL it = the current assets divided current liabilities at year t; AR it = the accounts receivable divided total assets at year t;
INV it = inventory divided total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; Consistent with prior studies such as those by Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984) , we use a number of variables to control for (1) loss exposure attributable to the audit and Table 8 presents the pooled-economy and the economy-by-economy regression results for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, where reporting of auditing fees is mandatory. Consistent with prior research, the auditing fee is significantly and positively related to loss exposure and audit risk. More specifically, consistent with the notion that the auditing fee is a function of the complexity of the audit, the coefficients of auditee size, percentage of accounts receivable and inventory in total assets, and group affiliation are positive and statistically significant in the pooled-economy and economy-by-economy regressions, with the exception that the coefficient of INV, which is not statistically significant for Malaysia, and the coefficient of GROUP, which is not statistically significant for Hong Kong. In addition, audit risk as proxied by auditee's ROA is significantly negatively related to the auditing fee in the pooled-economy regression, as well as in the Hong Kong and Malaysia regressions.
Consistent with H3, we find that the coefficient of DEV is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient of DEV*CV is negative and statistically significant in the pooled regression as well as in the Hong Kong and Singapore regressions. When the pooled-economy regression is run separately using Big Five and non-Big Five samples, the coefficient of DEV is positive and the coefficient of DEV*CV is negative in both regressions, but the two coefficients are significant only in the Big Five regression. This suggests that Big Five auditors charge firms with agency problems a premium as captured by the ownership variables, but non-Big Five auditors do not. Thus, pooling Big Five and non-Big Five clients in our regression weakens the ownership results.
We note that the coefficients of DEV and DEV*CV for Malaysia are statistically significant but with opposite signs to those of Hong Kong and Singapore. This suggests that Hong Kong and Singapore auditors charge a premium while Malaysian auditors charge a discount, if the controlling owner of the client firm possesses effective control and has a large divergence between control and ownership. Regulations in the audit market may explain why audit fees in Malaysia fail to reflect agency problems as we predicted. 17 In contrast to Hong Kong and Singapore, where the auditor markets are more internationalized and less regulated, Malaysia has an emerging audit market subject to fee regulations, which may give rise to the different fee structure. There is a smaller presence of Big Five auditors in Malaysia as is evident in our sample in which the average Big Five market share for Malaysia is 74%, which is significantly less than Hong Kong with 80.6% and Singapore with 88.3% (Table 1) . This lower demand for quality auditors could be driven by the Malaysian government's policies that discourage international investors' involvement in its stock market 18 . This is consistent with the results in Table 3 that Malaysian corporations incur the least in dollar value and in percentage of total assets of audit fees. Also consistent with the effect of the fee regulation, we find that Big Five auditors charge a fee premium in Hong Kong and Singapore, but not in Malaysia, which is also documented by Simon et al. (1992) .
As in the previous auditor choice analysis, we perform further regression analysis of auditing fees using sub-samples partitioned by profit, size, and leverage. In Table 9 , we find that the coefficient of DEV is significantly positive for low profit, small, and high leverage clients. The coefficient of DEV*CV is significantly negative in the regressions for small and high leverage clients. In contrast, none of the coefficients of the ownership variables is statistically significantly different from zero for high profit, large, or low leverage clients. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that auditing fee premiums reflect the degrees of agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. 17 Fee regulation is not uncommon in East Asia. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants set fee guidelines for their members. The Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants also set fee guidelines based on clients' total asset size. 18 Malaysia has a 30% limit on the total direct investment by foreign individuals and institutions in a company. Singapore has some limits on foreign direct investment only in strategic industries, while Hong Kong does not have any restrictions. Also, foreign securities firms can only operate as joint venture firms with local partners in Malaysia. There is no such requirement in Hong Kong and Singapore.
In summary, the results from the auditing fee analysis show that in Hong Kong and Singapore, auditors, specifically Big Five auditors, charge a premium for clients' agency problems as measured by their ultimate owners' control concentration and separation of control and ownership. This lends further support for the view that auditors play a monitoring role and alleviate agency conflicts in East Asia.
Audit opinion
Finally, to test our last hypothesis that low earnings will more likely trigger a qualified opinion for firms with large agency problems than for firms with small agency problems, we run the following pooled time-series cross-sectional LOGIT regression:
where, for sample firm i and year t, OPINION it = 1 when it is a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise; DCV it = 1 when the ultimate control exceed ownership rights, and 0 otherwise; and the other variables are defined earlier. 19 The regression results presented in Table 10 suggest that the qualified opinions are significantly negatively associated with firm profitability (ROA) for the whole sample and for both the Big Five and non-Big Five client samples. However, the other audit risk variables, CACL and LEV, cannot significantly explain audit opinions, with the exception that LEV is positively associated with qualified opinions in the non-Big Five regression. This is consistent with the auditing fee results that among the audit risk variable, only ROA is significantly negatively associated with auditing fees. The asset composition and organization complexity variables seem to give surprising results. The coefficients of GROUP and AR are negative and statistically significant in all three regressions, differing from prior predictions. Membership in a corporate group may reduce the propensity for getting qualified opinions if group firms manage to reduce bankruptcy risk using related party transactions as cross-subsidies. Also, ROA is positively correlated with AR, which may have confounded the result. Consistent with this conjecture, when the regression is separately estimated using high and low profitability samples, a procedure used in the auditor choice and auditing fee regressions, the coefficient of AR becomes statistically insignificant in both samples. Finally, the coefficient of DCV*ROA is negative and statistically significant for the whole sample and the Big Five sample regressions, but not for the non-Big Five sample regression. The whole sample and the Big Five sample results are consistent with H4 that low earnings would more easily trigger a qualified opinion for auditees with divergence of control and ownership. When taking the auditing fee and opinion results together, we find that Big Five auditors take into consideration their auditee's ownership structure in setting auditing prices and issuing qualified opinions, while non-Big Five auditors do not.
Since Table 2 shows that qualified opinions are not evenly distributed across the economies, we perform two diagnostic analyses. We repeat the regressions in Table   10 by dropping Indonesia, which had no qualified opinion from 1994 to 1996, and the results remain qualitatively the same. In addition, Table 2 shows that in 1995 and 1996, there were considerably more qualified opinions in Thailand with 15 (19.7%) in 1995 and 11 (13.4%) in 1996. The regression results in Table 10 also remain unchanged when both Indonesia and Thailand are dropped from the sample.
In summary, the results from the auditing opinion regressions indicate that Big Five auditors in East Asia are more stringent with clients with agency problems. This evidence corroborates earlier fee premium results that Big Five auditors fulfill the monitoring role by exerting more auditing efforts on firms subject to agency conflicts.
Conclusion
The concentrated ownership of East Asian corporations gives rise to conflicts of interest between controlling owners and minority shareholders. One big concern about containing the controlling owners' self-interested activities is that conventional internal and external governance mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeover markets are typically weak when corporate ownership is concentrated as in East Asia. To mitigate this agency problem, theory suggests that the controlling owners may find ways to employ bonding mechanisms to assure the minority shareholders that their interests would be protected. We examine if external independent auditors play this role in East Asia.
We find that in East Asia, firms subject to large agency conflicts, indicated by their high control concentration and a large separation of control and ownership, are more likely to hire Big Five auditors than firms less subject to agency problem. We further find that the auditee's ownership structure is associated with its choice of auditor only among small and high-risk auditees, whose threat of expropriation by ultimate owners is high, but not among large and low risk auditors whose threat of expropriation is low. Our results also show that Big Five auditors take into consideration their auditees' ownership structure when making pricing and opinion decisions, while non-Big Five auditors do not. More specifically, Big Five auditors charge clients with controlling owners who enjoy effective control but actually own a small stake in the firm a premium. Lastly, we document that poor earnings can more likely trigger a qualified opinion about Big Five clients with large agency problems, which suggests that Big Five auditors lower the qualification threshold as their clients' agency problems increase. The overall evidence lends support to the agency theory and suggests that auditors play a crucial monitoring role to mitigate agency problems in emerging markets. This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking the corporate ownership structure with mandatory external audits in the context of emerging markets. It is the first study that examines how agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders affect the choice of auditors, and the auditing fees and auditing opinions of the auditor. We suggest that auditors in emerging markets do play a role in corporate governance. From the policy perspective, our paper sheds light on the question of if auditors were at fault in the Asian Financial Crisis.
Future research could examine other corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets. Potential candidates could include institutional owners, financial analysts, and prominent directors. Such research will not only complement existing research that mostly focuses on developed economies but also provide policy suggestions to firms and governments in emerging markets that are striving to reform their corporate governance. (22) Absolute numbers of qualified opinions are in brackets. SIZE is total assets are in millions of U.S. dollars; LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets; EV is the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm minus the median percentage of voting rights in the corresponding economy; CV is the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; GROUP = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% in two-tailed test. AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEV i = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV i = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 41 AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEV i = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV i = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year is higher than its corresponding three-year median of the economy. The partitioning variable for profitability is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm size is total assets. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. 43 AUDITOR = 1 when auditor is a Big Five accounting firm, and 0 otherwise; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEV i = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV i = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. LAF it = natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; ROA it = net income divided by total assets at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; CACL it = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; AR it = accounts receivable divided total assets at year t; INV it = inventory divided total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEV i = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV i = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. LAF it = natural log of total audit fees at year t; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; ROA it = net income divided by total assets at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; CACL it = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; AR it = accounts receivable divided total assets at year t; INV it = inventory divided total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is controlled by an affiliated firm through a stock pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DEV i = 1 when the percentage of voting rights possessed by the largest ultimate owner of the firm exceeds the median in the corresponding economy, and 0 otherwise; CV i = the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies. For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. The sample is classified into high (low) subgroup when the partitioning variable of that year is higher than its corresponding three-year median of the economy. The partitioning variable for profitability is net income over total assets, for leverage is total liabilities over total assets and firm size is total assets. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test. OPINION it = 1 when it is a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise; SIZE it = natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars at year t; ROA it = net income divided by total assets at year t; LEV it = long-term debt divided by total assets at year t; CACL it = current assets divided current liabilities at year t; AR it = accounts receivable divided total assets at year t; INV it = inventory divided total assets at year t; GROUP i = 1 when the client firm is a member of a corporate group, and 0 otherwise; PYRAMID i = 1 when the client firm is in the bottom of the pyramid, and 0 otherwise; DCV i = 1 when the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is less than 1, and 0 otherwise; Fixed effects = dummy variables controlling for fixed effects of industries, calendar years and economies; For simplicity, results for the fixed effects are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 2-tailed test.
